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Abstract: We examine the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate debt maturity. We build 
upon the argument that managerial overconfidence is likely to mitigate the underinvestment problem, 
which is often the major concern for long-term debt investors. Within this context, we hypothesise that 
managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity. Our empirical evidence, based on time-varying 
measures RIRYHUFRQILGHQFHGHULYHGIURPFRPSXWDWLRQDOOLQJXLVWLFDQDO\VLVDQGGLUHFWRUV¶ dealings in 
WKHLURZQFRPSDQLHV¶VKDUHVVXSSRUWVWKLVK\SRWKHVLV6SHFLILFDOO\ZHILQGWKDW the changes in both 
first person singular pronouns and optimistic tone are positively related to the change in debt maturity. 
Moreover, we find that the insider trading-based overconfidence of CEO, who is most likely to 
influence investment decision and thus the underinvestment problem, has a stronger impact on debt 
maturity than the overconfidence of other directors (e.g. CFO). Overall, our study provides initial 
evidence for a positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation via overconfidence mitigating the 
agency cost of long-term debt.  
 
Keywords: debt maturity, managerial overconfidence, first person pronouns, optimistic tone, 
&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLQVLGHUWUDGLQJ. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Initial work highlights that managerial overconfidence often leads to sub-optimal corporate financial 
decisions (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 2008).1 In contrast, some behavioural finance theories 
(Shefrin, 2007; Hackbarth, 2009) suggest that managerial overconfidence can have a positive impact 
by reducing agency problems (e.g. debt overhang or underinvestment problem). However, empirical 
analysis supporting a positive impact of overconfidence is limited.2 We fill this gap by examining the 
debt maturity decision and providing evidence that managerial overconfidence significantly increases 
debt maturity. This is in line with managerial overconfidence mitigating the agency costs of long-term 
debt, namely the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977).3 An important policy implication of our 
finding is that the presence of overconfident managers may give firms freedom to choose their debt 
maturity structure instead of relying heavily on short-term debt as a mechanism to alleviate the 
underinvestment problem (see Barclay and Smith, 1995).  
        Given that debt maturity structure is an important element of the corporate financing strategy 
SXUVXHGE\PDQDJHUVWRLQIOXHQFHWKHLUILUPV¶FRVWRIFDSLWDOHJ, Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler, 
LWLVLPSRUWDQWWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHURYHUFRQILGHQWPDQDJHUV¶WHQGHQF\WRXQGHUHVWLPDWHULVNV
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKHLU ILUPV¶ IXWXUH SURVSHFWV DIIHFW debt maturity. More specifically, our study is 
motivated by two strands of literature. On one hand, the behavioural finance literature suggests that 
managerial overconfidence can mitigate some agency problems including the underinvestment 
problem (Hackbarth, 2009). On the other hand, it is well established that agency problems are apparent 
in the debt maturity setting and that, for example, shortening debt maturity may reduce the 
underinvestment problem (e.g., Barnea et al., 1980). Combining these two strands of literature, it is 
plausible that a particular agency problem is the underlying channel through which managerial 
overconfidence affects debt maturity. This is the first study that examines the overconfidence-debt 
maturity relation from an agency perspective. We augment the emergent literature on the link between 
                                            
1
 The managerial overconfidence literature builds upon an important finding in the psychological studies that people tend to 
be overconfident (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Overconfident people may overestimate their own abilities, the precision of their 
knowledge/information and the probabilities of good outcomes. In finance, Roll (1986) highlighted the significance of 
managerial overconfidence (i.e. hubris) in mergers and acquisitions decisions. More recently, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 
2008) document that managerial overconfidence may lead to value-destroying corporate investments.  
2
 Overconfidence can benefit shareholders because overconfident CEOs are better innovators (Hirshleifer et al., 2012).  
3
 The underinvestment problem arises when managers forgo good investment opportunities that increase the firm value but 
not the value of their shareholders (Myers, 1977). 
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managerial overconfidence and debt maturity in four ways. 
        First, we develop a new hypothesis that managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity. This 
is in contrast to two previous studies. Landier and Thesmar (2009) show that overconfident managers 
rely on short-term debt in order to benefit from their overconfident EHOLHIVDERXWWKHLUILUPV¶SURVSHFWV. 
From the information asymmetry perspective, Huang et al. (2016) argue that managerial 
overconfidence is associated with perceived information advantage and hypothesize that overconfident 
managers prefer short-term debt since it is less subject to the perceived mispricing. We contribute to 
this literature by examining the relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity from 
agency perspectives. Building upon Hackbarth (2009), we argue that the presence of overconfident 
managers, who invest earlier and more than their rational counterparts because they underestimate the 
value of the option-to-wait, alleviates the underinvestment problem that is traditionally considered as a 
NH\ UHDVRQ EHKLQG ILUPV¶ UHOLDQFH RQ VKRUW-term debt. We thus hypothesise that managerial 
overconfidence increase debt maturity. Our empirical analysis, based on 192 public listed UK firms 
during 2000-2010, supports this hypothesis.  
        Second, unlike the existing empirical studies that use time-invariant measures of overconfidence 
(e.g., Graham et al., 2013), we examine the impact of various time-varying measures of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate debt maturity structure. This is important because the overconfidence 
level of managers is likely to change over time due to the self-attribution bias (SAB), which is defined 
as the tendency to attribute success (failure) to own ability (external factors) (Miller and Ross, 1975). 
From this perspective, as PDQDJHUV WHQG WRDWWULEXWH WKHLUFRPSDQLHV¶VXFFHVV WR WKHLU own abilities, 
they learn to become overconfident.4 Consequently, the use of static measures of overconfidence in the 
literature may be misleading and imprecise. Our empirical analysis addresses this issue by examining 
the relation between several time-varying measures of managerial overconfidence and debt maturity.  
        Third, unlike the existing literature on overconfidence and debt maturity that relies primarily on 
survey-based5 measures of overconfidence, we employ µZRUGV-EDVHGPHDVXUHV¶DVZHOODV µDFWLRQ-
                                            
4
 +LODU\DQG+VXXVH³HQGRJHQRXVRYHUFRQILGHQFH´WRGHVFULEHWKHG\QDPLFVHOI-attribution-induced overconfidence. 
It is relevant to note that SAB is usually regarded as a dynamic counterpart of overconfidence (Hirshleifer, 2001). 
5
 It is difficult to capture time-variation in managerial overconfidence using a survey approach. Graham et al. (2013) measure 
optimism of CEOs and CFOs based on their survey in 2006 and Landier and Thesmar (2009) use entrepreneur optimism 
measure that is based on two surveys in 1994 and 1998 respectively.  
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EDVHGPHDVXUHV¶of managerial overconfidence2XUµZRUGV-EDVHGPHDVXUHV¶FDSWXUH³ZKDWPDQDJHUV
VD\´ and RXUµDFWLRQ-based measuUHV¶FDSWXUH³ZKDWPDQDJHUVGR´DQGERWKWKHLUZRrds and actions 
may reflect their overconfident beliefs. As we explain in detail in section 3, oXU µZRUGV-based 
PHDVXUHV¶ Dre derived using the FRPSXWDWLRQDO OLQJXLVWLF DQDO\VLV RI WKH &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW LQ
firms¶DQQXDO UHSRUWVZKLOHRXUµDFWLRQ-EDVHGPHDVXUHV¶DUHEDVHGXSRQGLUHFWRUV¶GHDOLQJV LQ WKHLU
own firms¶ VKDUHV. An additional benefit of our action-based measures is that they enable us to 
examine whether the identity of the overconfident managers matters. Specifically, we show that the 
link between debt maturity and overconfidence is primarily due to CEO overconfidence.  
        Finally, we examine further if the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation is contingent 
upon investment opportunities and the level of existing debt. Specifically, our analysis shows that the 
link between overconfidence and debt maturity is greater for firms with more growth options in their 
investment opportunities. This is an important finding given that the literature (e.g., Barclay and 
Smith, 1995) suggests that firms with more growth options rely on short-term debt due to the 
underinvestment problem. In addition, our findings show that the relation between overconfidence and 
debt maturity depends on existing leverage. We argue that high leverage PD\UHGXFHILUPV¶DELOLW\WR
raise new debt, which, in turn, limits the impact of overconfidence on debt maturity decision.  
        To summarize, this study provides the important new finding that managerial overconfidence, as 
indicated by their words and trading activities, increases debt maturity. Our further analysis confirms 
that the channel through which managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity is the 
underinvestment problem rather than other agency problems (e.g. risk-shifting and overinvestment 
problems). Our findings are largely robust to alternative measures of debt maturity and 
overconfidence, and alternative estimation methods. Overall, our study suggests that overconfidence 
can be a desirable managerial trait in the sense that it mitigates the agency costs of debt.  
        The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the standard 
and behavioural determinants of debt maturity and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
methodology and data. Section 4 discusses empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
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2. RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure  
Why do some firms raise long-term debt while others rely on short-term debt? Within Modigliani-
0LOOHU¶VSHUIHFWFDSLWDOPDUNHWV setting, any variation in debt maturity structure is irrelevant to the firm 
value (Brick and Ravid, 1985). However, early literature on corporate debt maturity argues that in the 
presence of various market imperfections, such as information asymmetries and agency problems, 
short-term debt may be optimal for some firms. For example, building upon Myers (1977), Barclay 
and Smith (1995) argue that due to the agency cost of debt µILUPZLWKPRUHJURZWKRSWLRQVLQ WKHLU
investment opportunity sets have less long-term debt in their capital structure¶SEHFDXVHVKRUW-
term debt enables managers to undertake investments without transferring benefits to existing debt-
holders. Within this context, short-term debt acts as a solution to the underinvestment problem. Using 
market-to-book ratio as a measure of growth options in ILUPV¶investment opportunities, Barclay and 
Smith (1995) find support for the above argument. Overall, the traditional finance literature focuses 
primarily on various firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, investment opportunities, liquidity, effective 
tax rate and earnings volatility) and capital market conditions (e.g., term structure and interest rate 
volatility) to explain variations in corporate debt maturity structure (see Stohs and Mauer, 1996; 
Johnson, 2003; Barclay et al., 2003; Antoniou et al., 2006).  
        In contrast, the µbehavioural corporate finance¶ literature argues that, besides firm and market 
characteristics mentioned above, managerial overconfidence6 is an important determinant of corporate 
finance and debt maturity (see, e.g., Hackbarth, 2008, 2009; Landier and Thesmar, 2009). We build 
upon this recent behavioural corporate finance literature and derive a hypothesis regarding the link 
between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity.  
 
 
                                            
6
 7KHZRUG³RYHUFRQILGHQFH´KDVRIWHQEHHQXVHGLQDEURDGVHQVHWKDWVXEVXPHVVHYHUDODVSHFWVRIRYHUFRQILGHQFHLQFOXGLQJ
PLVFDOLEUDWLRQWKDWLVRYHUHVWLPDWLRQRIWKHSUHFLVLRQRIRQH¶VNQRZOHGJHRUEHOLHIZKLFKOHDGs to narrower confidence 
interval, (2) better-than-DYHUDJHHIIHFW WKDW LVRYHUHVWLPDWLRQRIRQH¶VDELOLW\RUSRVLWLYHSHUVRQDODWWULEXWHV  LOOXVLRQRI
control, that is overestimation of the control one has over events and outcomes (see Ackert and Deaves (2010) for an 
overview of various facets of overconfidence). A closely related psychological bias is optimism which makes people 
overestimate (underestimate) the probability of good (bad) outcomes. However, overconfidence and optimism are often used 
interchangeably in the finance literature.  
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2.2. Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1. Managerial overconfidence increases corporate debt maturity 
Firm value depends not only on its existing assets but also on the optimal exercise of growth options 
embedded in its investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). Myers (1977) shows that in the presence of 
risky debt, managers may decide not to undertake good investment opportunities because some of the 
value generated by these investments goes to existing debt-holders. This is the well-known 
µXQGHULQYHVWPHQWSUREOHP¶ considered as an agency cost of debt. The underinvestment problem arises 
because shareholders are unwilling to bear the costs of some investment that only benefits the debt-
holders and it is assumed that managers maximize the equity value rather than the firm value. 
Following Myers (1977), several studies examine the significance of short-term debt in alleviating the 
underinvestment problem (e.g., Barnea, et al., 1980). Specifically, the literature suggests that, due to 
the underinvestment problem, firms rely on short-WHUPGHEWWKDWPDWXUHVµEHIRUHDQLQYHVWPHQWRSWLRQ
LVWREHH[HUFLVHG¶0\HUVSbecause it UHGXFHVPDQDJHUV¶LQFHQWLYHVWRIRUJRLQYestment 
opportunities that increase firm value (Barclay and Smith, 1995).  
        Managerial overconfidence may play a role in alleviating the underinvestment problem that 
creates a wedge between debt-KROGHUV¶DQGPDQDJHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDERXWLQYHVWPHQWopportunities. We 
build upon +DFNEDUWK¶V  PRGHO that studies the agency conflicts between bondholders and 
shareholders in the presence of managerial overconfidence. Hackbarth proposes that overconfident 
managers tend to invest earlier and more than their rational counterparts. The intuition is that 
overconfident managers, who have lower perceived uncertainty associated with new projects, 
underestimate the value of the option-to-wait in order to obtain more information about the project. 
This ³timing effect´, in turn, reduces the underinvestment problem that arises when managers forgo 
LQYHVWPHQWWKDWLQFUHDVHILUPYDOXHEXWPD\QRWLQFUHDVHVKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWK7  
       In the traditional finance literature, firms utilise short-term debt in order to alleviate the 
underinvestment problem. Building upon Hackbarth (2009), we posit that managerial overconfidence 
increases the degree of congruence between long-term debt-KROGHUV¶ DQG PDQDJHUV¶ SUHIHUHQFHV
                                            
7
 Following the previous literature (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Hackbarth, 2009), we also assume that overconfident 
PDQDJHUVPD[LPL]HWKHSHUFHLYHGFXUUHQWVKDUHKROGHUV¶YDOXHRUWKHYDOXHRIHTXLW\ 
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regarding the decisions to undertake future investment opportunities. This increased congruence in 
preferences is due to the timing effect that ensures that overconfident managers invest earlier and more 
than the rational managers (Hackbarth, 2009). Thus, overconfident managers make it less important 
for firms to rely on short-term debt as a mechanism to alleviate the underinvestment problem. In 
contrast, firms with rational managers, who are likely to underinvest, still have to rely heavily on 
short-term debt due to the underinvestment problem.  
       It is important to note that following Hackbarth (2009), we presume that rational debt-holders are 
able to distinguish between overconfident and rational managers and, in turn, price long-term and 
short-term debt accordingly. Specifically, rational debt-holders anticipate that the underinvestment 
problem is more severe in firms with rational managers who value the option-to-wait correctly than 
firms with overconfident managers. Consequently, potential debt investors are more willing to offer 
long-term debt to firms with overconfident managers who exhibit greater tendency to undertake future 
investment opportunities. Within this context, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Managerial overconfidence is positively related to debt maturity. 
 
2.2.2. The significance of PDQDJHUV¶LGHQWLW\LQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGOHYHUDJH 
This section highlights the significance of (1) PDQDJHUV¶LGHQWLW\, (2) future investment opportunities, 
and (3) existing debt level in determining the relation between managerial overconfidence and debt 
maturity structure. Since we contend that the positive relation between overconfidence and debt 
maturity is due to the underinvestment problem, it is plausible that the director that is most involved in 
major investment decisions is most relevant in determining the relation between overconfidence and 
debt maturity. The existing literature suggests that CEO has a stronger influence on investment than 
other directors (e.g., CFO) (Malmendier and Zheng, 2012). Consequently, CEO overconfidence 
should be of particular importance for debt maturity under the mechanism outlined for hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is 
intensified for firms with high levels of CEO overconfidence. 
        As noted earlier, the agency cost of debt is exacerbated for firms with more growth options in 
their future investment opportunities (see Barclays and Smith, 1995). Thus, firms with future 
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investment opportunities rely on short-term debt to alleviate the underinvestment problem. Our earlier 
discussion lays emphasis on the presence of overconfident managers as a mechanism that alleviates 
the underinvestment problem and, consequently, increases the availability of long-term debt for firms 
with overconfident managers. We propose that managerial overconfidence plays a more important role 
in determining debt maturity for firms with higher future investment opportunities. The rationale for 
this is as follows. When firms have very few growth options in their future investment opportunities, 
the presence of overconfident managers does little to align the PDQDJHUV¶DQGORQJ-term debt-KROGHUV¶
investment preferences. These firms, therefore, receive little or no benefit from having overconfident 
managers in terms of their access to long-term debt. However, for firms with more growth options in 
their future investment opportunities, the presence of overconfident managers align the PDQDJHUV¶DQG
long-term debt-KROGHUV¶LQYHVWPHQWSUHIHUHQFHV by ensuring that managers do not underinvest. These 
firms, therefore, are likely to benefit from having overconfident managers in terms of their access to 
long-term debt. Thus, given the importance of future investment opportunities, we propose the 
following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is 
intensified for firms with high investment opportunities. 
        We also note that the link between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity may depend on 
the existing corporate debt levels. According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, highly 
leveraged firms have high financial distress costs and therefore will be reluctant to and find it difficult 
to raise additional long-term debt financing. Within this context, the effectiveness of managerial 
overconfidence to align managers and long-term debt holGHUV¶LQYHVWPHQWpreferences is reduced. That 
is, for firms with high existing leverage, managerial overconfidence plays little or no role in enabling 
firms to raise long-term debt. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 4: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is 
reduced for firms with high levels of leverage. 
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2.2.3. The implications of other agency problems 
To develop our main hypothesis (hypothesis 1), we focus on the agency conflict between shareholders 
and bondholders, namely underinvestment problem. It is also important to discuss whether other 
potential agency conflicts including risk-shifting (or asset substitution) and overinvestment problem 
could be the underlying channels through which managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity.8  
        Risk-shifting problem: The behavioural finance literature (e.g., Shefrin, 2007; Hackbarth, 2009) 
suggests that managerial overconfidence, in a real-option framework, can mitigate not only the 
underinvestment problem, as discussed in our hypothesis development, but also the risk-shifting 
problem, both of which are shareholder-bondholder conflicts. The risk-shifting problem may occur 
when managers attempt to shift risk from shareholders to bondholders by investing in highly risky 
projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The purpose of risk-shifting is often to avoid or postpone firm 
bankruptcy. This means that the risk-shifting incentive of managers is more prevalent, especially when 
a firm is close to bankruptcy or financially distressed. Put differently, risk-shifting only becomes 
GHVLUDEOH IURP VKDUHKROGHUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH ZKHQ ILUP SHUIRUPDQFH deteriorates (e.g. Eisdorfer, 2008; 
Hackbarth, 2009). However, overconfident managers, who overestimate firm future performance, tend 
to underestimate the probability of bankruptcy. This underestimated probability of bankruptcy due to 
managerial overconfidence, in turn, increases the option value of waiting to risk-shift in a real-option 
model and thus reduces the incentive to shift risk (Hackbarth, 2009). Therefore, managerial 
overconfidence can mitigate agency costs associated with risk-shifting. 
        Furthermore, regarding the relationship between debt maturity and risk-shifting problem, prior 
literature (e.g., Barnea et al., 1980; Leland and Toft, 1996) suggests that longer-term debt increases 
the incentive for risk-shifting, while reducing debt maturity may mitigate the risk-shifting problem. 
This is primarily because the value of long-term debt is more sensitive to the changes in the value of 
firm assets than that of short-term debt. However, managerial overconfidence can mitigate risk-
shifting, which makes it less necessary to use short-term debt to reduce this particular agency problem. 
Thus, an alternative channel through which managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity is risk-
                                            
8
 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these two agency problems as potential alternative explanations of the 
positive effect of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity.  
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shifting. If managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity by mitigating the risk-shifting problem, 
we expect the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation to be more pronounced especially for 
firms that are financially distressed.  
Hypothesis 5: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is 
intensified for firms with high incentives for risk-shifting. 
        Overinvestment problem: Next, we discuss whether the overinvestment problem, the manager-
shareholder conflicts, can be an alternative explanation of the positive overconfidence-debt maturity 
relation. The overinvestment problem refers to PDQDJHUV¶WHQGHQF\WR purse their own interests at the 
expense of shareholders and is especially severe in firms with more free cash flow (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Hackbarth (2008) shows that managerial overconfidence can 
ameliorate the overinvestment problem. Specifically, overconfident managers underestimate the 
financial distress costs associated with debt financing and consequently may use more debt. The 
resulting higher debt level reduces the amount of free cash flow available for potential value-
destroying activities of a self-interested manager. Thus, managerial overconfidence reduces 
overinvestment problem and makes it less necessary to enhance the monitoring of managers by using 
more short-term debt. This mechanism is also called the ³leverage effect´ and implies a positive 
relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity.9 We examine whether the leverage 
effect works by testing the following relation. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relation between managerial overconfidence and leverage.  
        We empirically investigate whether risk-shifting and/or overinvestment can be alternative 
explanations of our findings in section 4.4 where hypotheses 5 and 6 are tested.  
 
3. THE METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1. The Empirical Model 
                                            
9
 In contrast, managerial overconfidence may exacerbate the overinvestment problem, because overconfident managers who 
overestimate the expected payoffs of future investment tend to overinvest (Gervais et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 2011). This 
exacerbated overinvestment problem due to managerial overconfidence makes debt investors reluctant to lend money to firms 
with overconfident managers. This is particularly true for long-term debt investors because long-term debt, unlike the short-
term debt that often serves as an important tool to monitor managers, is not as effective as short-term debt in making the 
managers closely and frequently monitored (e.g., Stulz, 2004). Thus, managerial overconfidence makes the firm rely more on 
short-term debt and thus is negatively related to debt maturity. This prediction is however inconsistent with our findings. 
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Following the existing literature on debt maturity (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 
1996), we use the following empirical model:  
ܦܯ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߛܼ௜௧ ൅ ෍ ߚ௞௡௞ୀଵ ܺ௞ǡ௜௧ ൅ ߭௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (1) 
where, ܦܯ௜௧ is a measure of the debt maturity of firm ݅ in year ݐ, ܼ is a measure of overconfidence, ܺ 
is the vector of k control variables, ߭௜ represents time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects, and ߝ௜௧ is the error term. Our main interest lies in the coefficient ߛ, which measure the relation between 
debt maturity (DM) and managerial overconfidence (Z). Our debt maturity measure (DM) is the ratio 
of debt that matures in more than one year to total debt. We choose our control variables based on 
previous debt maturity studies.10 As noted earlier, earlier empirical studies focus on firm- or market-
characteristics that capture the effects of agency cost, liquidity risk and signalling, maturity matching 
and tax on debt maturity. Based on this literature, the control variables that we use (with their 
predicted signs in parenthesis) are as follows: M/B asset (-) controls for agency cost, asset maturity (+) 
controls for maturity matching, firm size (+) controls for bankruptcy costs, liquidity (+) controls for 
agency cost, earnings volatility (-) controls for bankruptcy costs, leverage (+) controls for liquidity 
risk, abnormal earnings (-) controls for firm quality, tax (+) controls for tax, price performance (+) 
controls for market timing. All the variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
3.2. The Measurement of Managerial Overconfidence  
This section describes how we construct the time-varying words-based measures of managerial 
RYHUFRQILGHQFHXVLQJFRPSXWDWLRQDO OLQJXLVWLFDQDO\VLV DQGKRZZHJDXJHGLIIHUHQWGLUHFWRUV¶ HJ
CEO and CFO) confidence levels based on their dealings in their RZQILUPV¶VKDUHV 
 
3.2.1. Words-based Measures of Overconfidence: First Person Pronouns 
We construct two words-based measures of overconfidence based on computational linguistic analysis 
RI8.&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW. The linguistic analysis of financial narratives is becoming increasingly 
                                            
10
 For a review of debt maturity hypotheses, see Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Antoniou et al. (2006). For a summary of the 
debt maturity determinants and their predicted signs, see Table 1 in Antoniou et al. (2006). 
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popular in the academic research. Recent accounting and finance studies use several content analysis 
software (e.g., Diction, LIWC and General Inquirer) to analyse various dimensions of narratives11 
(e.g., personal pronouns, optimistic vs. pessimistic, forward-looking).  
        Our first words-based overconfidence measure is related to the use of first person pronouns in the 
&KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW. Previous accounting research suggests that the presence (absence) of first 
person pronouns LQ 86 FKLHI H[HFXWLYHV¶ OHWWHUV +\ODQG  DQG 8. &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW
(Clatworthy and Jones, 2006) may indicate the PHVVHQJHUV¶ intention to internalise (distance 
themselves from) good (bad) performance or news. Li (2010a) proposes a measure of self-attribution 
bias based on the content analysis of Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) by LIWC 
software. In particular, Li uses the ratio of first person pronouns to second- and third-person pronouns 
in the MD&A as a proxy for self-attribution bias.12 Clatworthy and Jones (2006) point out that the 
potential for self-attribution bias, as measured by first person pronouns, is enhanced by the unaudited 
nature of the CKDLUPDQ¶VStatement. Therefore, UK &KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVlikely to be more suitable 
than the US MD&A for capturing self-attribution bias. In brief, first person pronouns can be utilised to 
construct proxies for dynamic self-attribution-induced overconfidence. Following Li (2010a), we use 
LIWC software to measure the proportion of first person pronouns (ܨܲܲ ?ܮܫܹܥ௜௧LQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V
Statement as our first words-based overconfidence measure as follows: ܨܲܲ ?ܮܫܹܥ௜௧ ൌሺܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ݋݂ܨܲ ௜ܲ௧Ȁܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܹ݋ݎ݀ݏ௜௧ሻ כ  ? ? ?, where, ܨܲ ௜ܲ௧ represents either first person singular 
pronouns (ܫ) (e.g., I, me, mine) or first person plural pronouns (ܹܧ) (e.g., we, us, our) for firm i in 
year t13 and Total Wordsit is the total number of words in WKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWIRUILUPi in year t. 
        The reason why we test the effects of I and WE separately is that previous empirical studies use 
the sum of I and WE and the ratio of I to WE as proxies for self-attribution bias (Li, 2010a) and 
                                            
11
 Various texts analysed in the finance and accounting literature include MD&A (Kothari et al., 2009; Li, 2010a), CEO 
interviews (Kim, 2013) and earnings announcement (Rogers et al., 2011). For a more comprehensive summary of textual 
analysis studies, see Appendix A2 in Li (2010b).  
12
 Li (2010a) uses the percentage of first person pronouns as an alternative proxy for the SAB and finds similar results.  
13
 Self-attribution bias takes the following two forms (Staw et al., 1983): (1) enhancing attribution, meaning that success is 
attributed to internal factors and (2) defensive attribution, meaning that failure is attributed to external factors. In terms of 
/L¶V VHOI-attribution measure, the first person (second-and third-person) pronouns are used to capture the enhancing 
(defensive) attribution. However, we believe that the second-and third person pronouns are probably noisy/incomplete 
measures of defensive attribution, considering that Chairman may attribute failure to many external factors (e.g., the 
economy) without using any second-and third person pronouns (Li, 2010a). Therefore, our study focuses on self-referencing 
(i.e. the enhancing attribution) as time-varying measure of managerial overconfidence.  
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narcissism14 (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) respectively, both of which contribute to managerial 
overconfidence. Based on the above two operational definitions, the variable I is positively related to 
both constructs, however, variable WE is positively related to self-attribution bias but negatively 
related to narcissism. In brief, the relation between WE and managerial overconfidence might be 
ambiguous. Therefore, the results for the variable WE are expected to be more mixed given its 
differing relations to the components of managerial overconfidence.15 
 
3.2.2. Words-based Measure of Overconfidence: Tone Analysis 
Our use of tone analysis is based on the literature that suggests that tone used in corporate disclosures 
is potentially influenced by ³PDQDJHU-VSHFLILFWHQGHQFLHVWRZDUGRSWLPLVPRUSHVVLPLVP´ (Davis et al. 
2015; p. 671). We first construct individual tone measures based on the tone analysis16using the 
&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWfrom the UK annual reports and then construct the composite tone indices. 
        To construct a composite index of tone, we use six individual wordlists. Our first three wordlists 
are the same as those in Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) and Davis et al. (2015), namely 
OPTIMISM, TONE_H and TONE_LM. OPTIMISM is a measure of net optimism17 counted using a 
dictionary in Diction 6. 18 Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) use OPTIMISM as a measure of fund manager 
overconfidence. TONE_H and TONE_LM are two wordlists developed by Henry (2008) and Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) respectively to measure positive and negative words especially in a financial 
context. In particular, TONE_H and TONE_LM are calculated as the ratio of the difference between 
positive and negative words to the sum of positive and negative words.19 
                                            
14
 A narcissistic personality is considered as a contributor to hubris (i.e. exaggerated self-confidence) (Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007)0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\QDUFLVVLVP LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK³UHODWLYHRSWLPLVPDQG
confidence about positive outcomHV´&KDWWHUMHHDQG+DPEULFN, 2007).  
15
 We find that neither the first person pronouns (i.e. the sum of I and WE) nor the ratio of I to WE is statistically significantly 
related to debt maturity.  
16
 Tone analysis (and more generally textual analysis) is becoming increasingly popular in recent accounting and finance 
studies. For example, Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) examine the relation between disclosure tone and shareholder 
litigation. For a review on studies of corporate disclosures, please see Li (2010a).  
17
 ,Q'LFWLRQRSWLPLVPLVGHILQHGDV³ODQJXDJHHQGRUVLQJVRPHSHUVRQJURXSFRQFHSWRUHYHQWRUKLJKOLJKWLQJWKHLUSRVLWLYH
HQWDLOPHQWV´ 
18
 As a unique feature of Diction software, there is standardization procedure when calculating a particular item. In particular, 
ZHFRPSDUHRXUFROOHFWHG&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWVWRWKUHHDOWHUQDWLYHQRUPVLQ'LFWLRQLQFOXGLQJDOOFDVHVFRUSRUDWH
financial reports and (3) corporate public relations. Our empirical results are qualitatively similar using alternative norms.  
19
 7KH WHUPV ³SRVLWLYHQHJDWLYH´ DQG ³RSWLPLVWLFSHVVLPLVWLF´ DUH RIWHQ XVHG LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH HJ 'DYLV
3LJHUDQG6HGRU/LEVWDQGDUGL]HWKHWHUPVWR³SRVLWLYHQHJDWLYH´LQVWHDGRI³RSWLPLVWLFSHVVLPLVWLF´ 
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        In addition to the above measures, we also use CERTAIN1, CERTAIN2 and EMOTION, which 
are positively related to optimism. CERTAIN1 and EMOTION20 are measured using dictionaries in 
LIWC 2007. CERTAIN2 is another measure of certainty21 based on a dictionary in Diction 6. 
CERTAIN2 has also been used to measure overconfidence of fund managers (Eshraghi and Taffler, 
6LPLODUO\/LELQFOXGHV³XQFHUWDLQWRQH´ZKLFKLVKLJKO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKQHJDWLYH tone, 
in his tone measure. Based on the above six individual tone measures, we form a composite tone index 
using principal component analysis. We define ܶ݋݊݁ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௜௧ as the first principal components of the 
correlation matrix of six raw tone measures.22  ܶ݋݊݁ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௜௧ ൌ ෍ ܮ݋ܽ݀݅݊݃௝ כ ܶ݋݊݁ ? ௜ܺ௝௧଺௝ୀଵൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܧ݉݋ݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܥ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ ?௜௧ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܱ݌ݐ݅݉݅ݏ݉௜௧൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܥ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ ?௜௧ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܶ݋݊݁ ?ܪ௜௧ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܶ݋݊݁ ?ܮܯ௜௧ (2) 
where, ܶ݋݊݁ ? ௜ܺ௝௧ represent individual tone measure j of firm i in fiscal year t. ܮ݋ܽ݀݅݊݃௝ is the loading 
for individual tone measure j. The loading for Certain1 and Certain2 is much lower compared with 
other tone measures. However, our empirical results are qualitatively similar when we exclude those 
two measures of certainty tone from the composite index. Furthermore, to address the concern that the 
raw tone might be contaminated by firm-specific variables23, a composite index of the orthogonalized 
tone measures is constructed as follows. First, we regress each individual tone measure on standard 
determinants of debt maturity. Next, a composite index (ܶ݋݊݁ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௜௧ୄ) is formed based on the first 
principal component of six residuals (i.e. ܶ݋݊݁ ? ௜ܺ௝௧ୄ ൌ ߝ௜௝௧) from the above regressions.24 
 
 
                                            
20
 An earlier veUVLRQRI/,:&KDV D FDWHJRU\QDPHG³RSWLPLVP´KRZHYHU LQ WKHYHUVLRQZRUGV DUH FODVVLILHGPRUH
EURDGO\LQWR³SRVLWLYHHPRWLRQ´DQG³QHJDWLYHHPRWLRQ´ 
21
 ,Q 'LFWLRQ FHUWDLQW\ LV GHILQHG DV ³ODQJXDJH LQGLFDWLQJ UHVROXWHQHVV LQIOH[LELOLW\ DQG FRPSOHteness and a tendency to 
VSHDNH[FDWKHGUD´ 
22
 The first component, with an eigenvalue of 2.59, explains 43.2 percent of our sample variance. The eigenvalue of second 
component is close to one.  
23
 In terms of the determinants of tone (e.g., current performance, growth opportunities, operating risks and complexity), 
Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2013) find that tone, as measured using Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist, is positively 
related to market-to-book and volatility of stock returns and negatively related to firm size, age and number of business 
segments. Our orthogonalized tone measure (TONE_RES) controls for all standard determinants of debt maturity. 
24
 The first component explains 41.3 percent of the sample variance. The eigenvalues of first and second components are 2.48 
and 1.16 respectively.  
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6XLWDELOLW\RI&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWIRUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIZRUGV-based overconfidence and a caveat: 
There are four reasons for using the &KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW25 from the UK annual reports as the source 
of narrative to construct managerial words-based measures. )LUVW&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVZLGHO\UHDG
by investors and analysts (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). Indeed, according to Clatworthy and Jones 
S&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLV³WKHPRVWUHDGRIWKH8.¶VDFFRXQWLQJQDUUDWLYHV´DQG³WKH
ORQJHVWHVWDEOLVKHG´ 26 6HFRQG&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVODUJHO\XQDXGLWHGDQGQRWKHDYLO\UHJXODWHG
By contrast, the language used iQ'LUHFWRUV¶5HSRUWLVPXFKPRUHIRUPDODQGVWDQGDUGODUJHO\GXHWR
UHJXODWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWVDQGWKXVLVSUREDEO\OHVVOLNHO\WRUHIOHFWPDQDJHUV¶EHKDYLRXUDOWUDLWV7KLUG
disclosure-related litigation is rare in the UK relative to the US. Therefore, the UK accounting 
QDUUDWLYHVHJ&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWDUHUHODWLYHO\ OHVVFRQVWUDLQHGFRPSDUHGZLWKWKH0'	$LQ
the US 10-.UHSRUW)LQDOO\ZKLOH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVVLJQHGE\FKDLUPDQZKRLVRIWHQDQRQ-
executive director in the UK, existing literature27 seems to agree that the Statement communicates the 
view of the board rather than the view of the Chairman alone (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003, 2006). 
7KLVPHDQVWKDWILUP¶VNH\ILQDQFLDOGHFLVLRQPDNHUVHJ&(2&)2DOVRKDYHDQLQIOXHQFHRQWKH
chRLFHRIODQJXDJHLQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW 2YHUDOOWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWWKDWLVZLGHO\UHDG
and is not heavily influenced by accounting/regulatory regimes is likely to allow us to capture the 
overconfident beliefs of managers.  
        However, an important caveat of using &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW WR JDXJH VHQLRU PDQDJHUV¶
overconfidence must be noted. In our analysis, we implicitly assume that senior managers (e.g. CEO) 
of all the firms in our sample have significant and similar impacts on the languDJHXVHGLQ&KDLUPDQ¶V
Statement. However, this assumption may be unrealistic, because the extent to which the preparation 
RI&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVLQIOXHQFHGE\VHQLRUPDQDJHUVPD\YDU\IURPILUPWRILUP,IWKLVLVWKH
case, one may argue that Chairman¶V6WDWHPHQWUHIOHFWWKHPDQDJHULDORYHUFRQILGHQFHin some, but not 
                                            
25
 2QHPD\ DVN ZK\RXU OLQJXLVWLF DQDO\VLVRQO\ IRFXVHVRQ&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW JLYHQ WKDW RWKHU QDUUDWLYHV e.g., CEO 
review, financial review, business review, operational review, might also be available in the annual report. However, these 
reviews are relatively less standard, meaning that (a) not every firm provides statements made by CEO and CFO separately 
and (b) the structure, content and length of their statements vary greatly from firm to firm.  
26
 0DQ\SUHYLRXV VWXGLHVRQ8.DFFRXQWLQJQDUUDWLYHV IRFXVRQ&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW VHH HJ6PLWK DQG7DIIOHU 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Clatworthy and JRQHV6PLWK DQG7DIIOHU XVH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW WRSUHGLFW
firm bankruptcy.  
27
 )RU H[DPSOH &ODWZRUWK\ DQG -RQHV  DUJXH WKDW DFFRXQWLQJ QDUUDWLYHV VXFK DV 8. &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW DOORZ
³PDQDJHPHQW´ WRGHVFULEHFRUSRUDWHILQDQFLDOSHUIRrmance. Clatworthy and Jones (2006) also argue that managers tend to 
³HODERUDWHRQSRVLWLYHILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW´ 
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all, firms. It is extremely difficult for our empirical analysis to capture this type of heterogeneity 
because it is not feasible to investigate how each individual firm prepares their ChaLUPDQ¶V
Statement.28 To summarise, the words-based measures broadly reflect the confidence level of senior 
managers. In what follows, we introduce action-based measures which more precisely capture the 
confidence level of individual directors.  
 
3.2.3. Action-Based Measure of Overconfidence: Net Purchase Ratio (NPR) 
Our third measure of overconfidence is based on the extent of directors¶ trading of their own firms¶ 
shares. The GLUHFWRUV¶trading patterns may reflect their perceptions about the prospects of their firms 
existing projects and future investment opportunities (Jenter, 2005). Overconfident managers tend to 
overestimate their firmV¶ value and, hence, are more willing to purchase their own ILUPV¶stocks. This 
trading behaviour FDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDVPDQDJHUV¶PDUNHW WLPLQJ LQ WKHLUSHUVRQDOSRUWIROLRV In the 
spirit of Malmendier and Tate (2005), Jenter (2005) and Jin and Kothari (2008), we use GLUHFWRUV¶
trading-based measure of managerial overconfidence. In particular, we construct the valued-based and 
volume-based net purchase ratio (NPR) using the value and volume of open market purchases and 
sales respectively as follows: ܴܰܲ௜௧ ൌ ሺܤݑݕ௜௧ െ ݈݈ܵ݁௜௧ሻȀሺܤݑݕ௜௧ ൅ ݈݈ܵ݁௜௧ሻ, where, ܴܰܲ௜௧ is the value-
based (or volume-based) NPR of directors of firm ݅ in fiscal year ݐ. ܤݑݕ௜௧ is the aggregate value (or 
volume) of insider purchases and ݈݈ܵ݁௜௧ is the aggregate value (or volume) of insider sales. Besides, 
the value-based and volume-based NPRs for individual directors including Chairman, CEO and CFO 
are also constructed. The NPR lies in the interval [-1, 1], with higher NPR indicating higher 
managerial overconfidence. 
 
 
                                            
28
 7RDGGUHVV WKLV FRQFHUQZH FRQGXFW VRPH VXSSOHPHQWDU\ WHVWV WR FKHFN ZKHWKHU WKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW UHIOHFts the 
beliefs of other members of the board of directors. We choose a random subsample of 300 annual reports from our main 
VDPSOH :H UHTXLUH WKDW WKHVH UHSRUWV KDYH ERWK &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW DQG &(2¶V UHYLHZ DYDLODEOH LQ WKHP :H WKHQ
examine whether the language dimensions constructed based on those two statements are similar. We find that pairwise 
correlation coefficients of the following variables: OPTIMISM (0.23), TONE_LM (0.43), NET EMOTION (0.46) and the tone 
index, TONE (0.49), I (0.24) and WE (0.45) are all statistically significant at 1% level. In addition, we investigate whether 
ODQJXDJHXVHGLQ&(2¶VUHYLHZKDVDVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQWKHODQJXDJHXVHGLQ&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW:HUHJUHVVODQJXDJH
GLPHQVLRQVRI&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW RQ WKHLU FRXQWHUSDUWV FRQVWUXFWHGEDVHGRQ&(2¶V UHYLHZ$V H[SHFWHG DOO ODQJXDJH
GLPHQVLRQV FRQVWUXFWHG EDVHG RQ &(2¶V UHYLHZV KDYH SRVLWLYH DQG VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW LPSDFWV RQ WKRVH EDVHG RQ
&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW2YHUDOOEDVHGRQWKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHDQGRQour supplementary tests, we assume that the measures 
EDVHGRQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWDUHJRRGalbeit imperfect, proxies for managerial overconfidence. 
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3.3. Estimation Methods  
Regarding estimation methods, we initially estimate our empirical model using pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects estimators. Several diagnostic tests are conducted to decide which estimator 
is more suitable. First, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test favours random effects 
against the pooled OLS. Hausman test is then conducted to decide between random effects and fixed 
effects estimators, which suggests that fixed effects estimator is superior. These two tests indicate that 
the fixed effects estimator seems to be more appropriate. Our discussion therefore focuses on the fixed 
effects estimation results. Furthermore, as robustness checks, we use random effects Tobit (RE-Tobit) 
estimator because our dependent variable, debt maturity ratio, is bounded between zero and one. In 
addition, following previous studies on debt maturity (e.g., Datta et al., 2005), we also use 2SLS 
regression where leverage and debt maturity are simultaneously determined.  
 
3.4. The Sample 
This study uses data from the following sources. 7KH 8. ILUPV¶ financial data is obtained from 
Thomson Worldscope database. 'LUHFWRUV¶ trading data is sourced from Hemmington Scott database. 
&KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQWs are manually collected from the company annual reports, which are 
downloaded either through Northcote website or directly from company websites. Our sample of 
unbalanced panel data is constructed as follows. The selection of sample period is guided by data 
availability. All financial and utility firms and firm observations with missing financial data are 
excluded. Firms in our sample must have at least three consecutive annual observations to examine the 
role of time-varying words-based overconfidence.  
        To construct words-based measures of overconfidence, we require the digital version of the UK 
company annual reports, so that the Chairman¶V Statement can be readable by the content analysis 
software (i.e. LIWC 2007 and Diction 6).29 In addition, to construct insider trading-based measure of 
overconfidence, only those firms with insider transactions (i.e. open market purchases and/or sales) for 
at least three consecutive years are selected. Besides the NPRs of executive and non-executive 
                                            
29
 ,QWHUPVRIWKHSURFHGXUHRIFRQWHQWDQDO\VLVZHILUVWH[WUDFW&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWVIURPDQQXDOUHports. Next, we detect 
transformation errors in the combined text file using the Spelling & Grammar function in Microsoft Word 2010. Finally, 
various types of errors (examples are available upon request) are corrected before the texts are inputted in the LIWC 2007.  
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directors, we also construct the NPR of individual directors including Chairman, CEO and CFO. 
Those directors with joint positions (e.g., CEO duality) or without job title information are excluded 
from our sample.30 All the NPRs are constructed accordinJWRILUPV¶ILVFDO\HDUHQG In terms of initial 
sample sizes and the impacts of various data filters, for financial and accounting information we obtain 
a list of UK public firms (3,318 firms) from Worldscope. A list of firms (2,024 firms) with insider 
trading data is from Hemmington Scott. We exclude financial and utility firms. We then merge the 
above two datasets using the SEDOL. The merged dataset includes 1,099 firms. Firms with less than 
three consecutivH\HDUV¶GDWDDUHGURSSHGDQGWKHVDPSOHVL]HLVUHGXFHGWRILUPV)LUPVZLWKRXW
machine-UHDGDEOH &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQWV DUH DOVR H[FOXGHG )LUP-years with digital annual reports 
before the year 2000 are limited and are therefore excluded. To eliminate the effect of extreme values, 
all independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final sample comprises 192 
firms and 865 firm-year observations over the period of 2000-2010.31 
 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 Panel A shows descriptive statistics of our main variables. The mean of the debt maturity ratio 
(LTD/TD) is 0.664. The means of first person singular (I) and plural (WE) pronouns are 0.432 (percent 
of total words) and 2.743 (percent of total words) respectively. The total percentage of first person 
pronouns is therefore 3.175. This figure is much higher than the percentage of first person pronouns in 
the MD&A (i.e. 1.27) in Li (2010a). This could be attributed to the fact that the MD&A is more 
heavily regulated and subject to DXGLWRU¶VH[DPLQDWLRQ/La) while the CKDLUPDQ¶VStatement is 
unaudited. )URPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWVHHPVWREHDPRUHVXLWDEOHW\SHRIILQDQFLDO
narrative from which to measure overconfidence. 7KHPHDQRI+HQU\¶VWRQHPHDVXUHTone_H 
(mean=0.705), is higher than that of /RXJKUDQ DQG 0F'RQDOG¶V  WRQH PHDVXUH Tone_LM 
(mean=0.545). This is because /RXJKUDQ DQG 0F'RQDOG¶V 11) wordlist includes a more 
comprehensive list of negative words than that of Henry (2008). For the insider trading-based measure 
                                            
30
 Due to data availability, the tests of the roles of the NPR of individual directors are based on a smaller sample.  
31
 The Hemmington Scott database provides insider trading data from 1994. However, our sampling procedure ends up with 
very few observations between 1994 and 1999. That is why our sample period starts in 2000.  
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of overconfidence, RQDYHUDJHWKH135VRI&KDLUPDQDUHWKHKLJKHVWZKLOH&(2V¶135VDUHPXFK
lower compared with those of Chairman and CFO.  
 
3.4.2. Correlation Analysis  
Table 1 Panel B shows the correlation matrix with main variables. The first person pronouns, i.e. I and 
WE, are positively correlated. Both I and WE are positively correlated with most tone measures. Most 
of the tone measures (except Certain2) are positively correlated with each other. For example, 
Optimism is positively correlated with all other tone measures. Regarding the correlations between 
various NPRs, we find that (1) value-based and volume-based NPRs of the same individual are highly 
correlated, (2) the correlation between the NPRs of CEO and CFO is also high and (3) the correlation 
between the NPRs of Chairman and those of CEO is relatively low, while the correlation between 
Chairman and CFO is even lower. These correlation coefficienWV VXJJHVW WKDW &KDLUPDQ¶V WUDGLQJ
activities are not perfectly consistent with CEO and especially CFO. In untabulated correlation 
analysis, we find positive and statistically significant relations between the debt maturity ratio and 
several independent variables including firm size, asset maturity, leverage and price performance, 
which is consistent with the theoretical predictions. Both I and WE are positively related to price 
performance.32  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Managerial Overconfidence and Debt Maturity  
This section presents empirical evidence on the impact of the level of overconfidence on the level of 
debt maturity. More specifically, we examine the effects of two words-based measures of 
overconfidence: first person pronouns and optimistic tone. 
 
 
                                            
32
 Stock price is found to be interrelated with the presence of the self-attribution. Staw et al. (1983) document that good prior 
stock performance may lead to more enhancing attributions, followed by subsequent stock price increases. 
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4.1.1. The Role of First Person Pronouns  
Table 2 (Panel A) examines the impact of first person pronouns (I and WE), as proxies for managerial 
overconfidence, on debt maturity. The coefficient estimates on the first person singular pronouns (I) 
are positive and statistically significant (p-value=0.027) in fixed effects regressions. This evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis 1 that overconfidence has a positive effect on debt maturity. Results for 
the first person plural pronouns (WE) are more mixed. We find the coefficient estimate on WE is 
positive but statistically insignificant. The economic significance of the WE coefficient is also modest. 
The stronger results for I compared to WE likely reflects that I is positively associated with narcissism 
but WE is negatively associated with narcissism which contributes to overconfidence (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007). Although the effect of WE is insignificant in the full sample, we find, in untabulated 
tests, that the positive effect of WE on debt maturity is statistically significant at 10% level (p-
value=0.058) for firm-year observations with below-median leverage but remains insignificant for 
other observations with above-median leverage. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 4 that high 
leverage weakens the positive effect of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity. We further test 
and discuss the moderating role of leverage in Section 4.3.2. 
        Next, by taking a closer look at the distribution of I and WE, we find that some firms do not use 
first person (especially singular) SURQRXQVLQWKHLU&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW. Over 20% of I in our sample 
are zero. More importantly, those zero values of I tend to be in consecutive years, in which case there 
is no within-firm variation in the number of I used. Therefore, excluding firm-years with zero I from 
the sample will make the fixed effects estimator perform better. As expected, the positive coefficient 
on I_NON-ZERO is highly significant at 1% level (p-value=0.004) after excluding firm-years with 
zero I. In addition, around 8% of WE in our sample are zero. We also exclude those firm-years with 
zero WE. However, the relation between WE_NON-ZERO and debt maturity is still insignificant. To 
conclude, the highly significant positive effect of I_NON-ZERO on debt maturity provides strong 
support for the hypothesis of positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation (hypothesis 1). 
        To sum up, the positive and significant effects of I (model 1), Ln (I+1) (model 3) and I_NON-
ZERO (model 5) on debt maturity support the prediction of the positive effect of overconfidence 
hypothesis (hypothesis 1). These findings are consistent with overconfidence being beneficial from 
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long-term debt-KROGHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYH because overconfidence can ameliorate the agency cost of debt 
(Hackbarth, 2009). Thus, consistent with our hypothesis 1 overconfident managers have a longer debt 
maturity than realist managers.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.1.2. The Role of Optimistic Tone 
7DEOH  3DQHO % H[DPLQHV WKH LPSDFWV RI YDULRXV PHDVXUHV RI RSWLPLVWLF WRQH RI &KDLUPDQ¶V
Statement on debt maturity. Considering that the tone-debt maturity relation might be potentially 
driven by unobserved time-invariant firm fixed effects, we present results from fixed effects 
estimators. Panel B shows that the coefficient estimates on all individual and composite tone measures 
are positive but statistically insignificant. However, in untabulated pooled OLS regressions (available 
upon request), OPTIMISM and TONE_LM have positive and statistically highly significant impacts on 
debt maturity (p-value=0.004 and 0.028 respectively). In addition, the coefficients on two composite 
tone indices, TONE and TONE_RES, are also positive and statistically highly significant at 1% level 
(p-value=0.002 and 0.001 respectively) without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Taken 
together, the positive tone-debt maturity relation is statistically highly significant in the OLS 
regressions but appears to be insignificant after controlling for firm fixed effects in the fixed effects 
regressions. This observation indicates the existence of managerial fixed effects that may drive firm 
policies as documented in Bertrand and Schoar (2003). Furthermore, Davis et al. (2015) find that the 
WRQH RI HDUQLQJV FRQIHUHQFH FDOOV LV DOVR LQIOXHQFHG E\ PDQDJHULDO ³VW\OH´ LH PDQDJHU-specific 
factors such as gender and early career experiences). To conclude, the positive tone-debt maturity 
relation seems to be driven by firm/managerial fixed effects. The implication of this observation is that 
it is important to control for firm fixed effects when examining the effect of tone on firm policies.  
 
4.2. Change in Managerial Overconfidence and Change in Debt Maturity 
Prior behavioural corporate finance literature focuses primarily on static overconfidence measures. 
Recall that overconfidence can vary over time because of self-attribution bias, thus time-variations in 
managerial overconfidence are potentially extremely important. However, static overconfidence 
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measures predominate in the behavioural corporate finance literature. Malmendier and Tate's (2005, 
2008) option-based and press-based overconfidence measures are widely used, both of which are static 
measures. Graham et al. (2013) examine the relation between static survey-based overconfidence 
measure and debt maturity. Landier and Thesmar (2009) find that their survey-based optimism 
measure (i.e. expectation errors) tend to persist over the two time periods (i.e. year 1994 and 1998) 
they examine and do not provide evidence on the effect of changes of optimism on debt maturity. 
Thus, the effect of time-variation in overconfidence is largely under-researched.  
        In this section, we examine the effect of change in overconfidence on the change in debt 
maturity.33 This is an important and novel extension of the existing literature on behavioural corporate 
financing. We need time-varying measures of overconfidence, such as the words-based measures 
examined in this paper to conduct this analysis. We can therefore shed new light on the question: how 
sensitive are changes in debt maturity to changes in overconfidence?  
        In Table 3, we examine the changes of words-based overconfidence measures on the change in 
debt maturity using OLS regressions with first differenced data. Consistent with our main result in 
Table 2 that I has a significantly positive effect on debt maturity,  ? I also has a positive and highly 
significant effect (p-value=0.011) on the change of debt maturity. In addition, we find that the changes 
in several tone measures, including  ? TONE_LM and  ? TONE_RES, have positive and statistically 
significant impacts on the change in debt maturity (p-value=0.078 and 0.100 respectively).34 In brief, 
the above evidence shows that the increase in the level of words-based managerial overconfidence is 
significantly associated with increase in debt maturity. This observation supports the agency cost 
hypothesis of a positive relation between overconfidence and debt maturity (hypothesis 1). More 
broadly, we provide new and novel evidence that time-variation in managerial overconfidence can 
have an important impact on corporate financing; thus the impact of time-variation in managerial 
overconfidence in other corporate finance contexts would be a fertile line for future research. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                            
33
 Words-based overconfidence measures (including first person pronouns and especially tone measures) are quite volatile. 
Specifically, for example, the within, between and overall standard deviation of Tone_LM are 0.216, 0.195 and 0.290 
respectively and the mean and standard deviation of the yearly average of Tone_LM are 0.533 and 0.084 respectively. 
34
 The NPRs display relatively little time variation and hence we do not report the impact of a change in NPR here. For 
example, over 60% of the NPRs take the value of one. 
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4.3. Further Analysis of the Moderating Effects of 0DQDJHUV¶ ,GHQWLW\ ,QYHVWPHQW
Opportunities and Leverage 
4.3.1. The Role of NPRs of Chairman, CEO and CFO  
This section is motivated by the fact that directors have different core duties (Malmendier and Zheng, 
2012). Most existing studies focus on biased beliefs of CEOs. This is because CEO is often considered 
as the key corporate decision maker (Graham et al., 2013). On the other hand, Ben-David, Graham, 
DQG +DUYH\  GRFXPHQW WKDW &)2¶V ELDVHG EHOLHIV also have significant influence on various 
FRUSRUDWHSROLFLHV0DOPHQGLHUDQG=KHQJ¶VHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVVXJJHVWVWKDW&(2¶VKDYHPRVW
influence upon investment decisions, while CFO has a greater effect on equity issuance. If the positive 
overconfidence-debt maturity relation is driven by reducing the agency cost of debt (i.e. 
underinvestment problem) then the overconfidence of director who has greatest influence over 
investment decisions, the CEO, should play a more significant role in increasing debt maturity.  
        Table 4 reports the results regarding the impact of NPRs of Chairman, CEO and CFO on debt 
maturity. The coefficients on both value-based and volume-based NPRs of CEO are significantly 
positive (p-value=0.062 and 0.076 respectively). However, the NPRs of CFO are insignificant. The 
NPRs of Chairman are also insignificant, which is perhaps not surprising considering that most UK 
Chairmen are non-executive directors. 7KHVH UHVXOWV VXJJHVW WKDW WKH &KDLUPDQ¶s Statement in the 
DQQXDOUHSRUWVGRHVQRWRQO\UHIOHFW&KDLUPDQ¶VRYHUFRQILGHQWEHOLHIEXWDOVRWKDWRIVHQLRUPDQDJHUV
especially the CEO35; this interpretation is consistent with prior research (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003, 
2006). The positive significant relation found for the CEO (only) is consistent with hypothesis 2 that 
the overconfidence of CEOs, who have a greater influence upon investment policy (Malmendier and 
Zheng, 2012), has a more significant and positive effect on debt maturity.36  
        However, one may argue that the insider trading activities may reflect directorV¶ SULYDWH
information, meaning that insiders with positive private information tend to purchase more their own 
                                            
35
 The results for CEO are positive (consistent with all words-based measures) and significant (consistent with some words-
based measures), while the results for CFO and Chairman do not have the same sign as those for the words-based measures. 
36
 In unreported results we examined the NPRs of all the executive directors. These results confirm a positive relation 
EHWZHHQH[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRUV¶RYHUFRQILGHQFHDQGGHEWPDWXULW\VXSSRUWLQJK\SRWKHVLV 
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ILUP¶V VKDUHV DQG DUH UHOXFWDQW WR VHOO which in turn increases the NPR. However, this alternative 
interpretation is not consistent with our empirical results. Based on the signalling model, managers 
will signal the quality of their firms by issuing short-term debt (Flannery, 1986). In this case, 
managers with positive private information, as indicated by high NPR, should use more short-term 
debt. This prediction, from the signalling model, is contradicted by the observed positive and 
significant relation between the NPRs of CEO and debt maturity. Thus, we tentatively suggest our 
evidence based on NPRs of CEO is not driven by private information.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.3.2. The Moderating Effects of Investment Opportunities and Leverage 
We perform subsample analysis to examine the sensitivity of overconfidence-debt maturity relation to 
several firm characteristics. The goal here is to examine if there is further support for the agency cost 
of debt mechanism that we hypothesise to have been driving the observed positive relation between 
overconfidence and debt maturity. Table 5 presents subsample analysis where the full sample is split 
into two subsamples based on measures of investment opportunities (market-to-book value of asset 
and market-to-book value of equity) and a measure of long-term debt capacity (leverage). This 
subsample analysis can shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the overconfidence-debt maturity 
relation by looking at the sensitivity of overconfidence-debt maturity relation to the above firm 
characteristics. Our subsample analysis focuses on three overconfidence measures: first person 
singular pronouns (I) and the NPRs of CEO (CEO_VA and CEO_VOL) which have positive and 
significant impacts on debt maturity in our main tests in Table 2 and 4 respectively.  
        Market-to-book value: Firms with more investment opportunities, as indicated by higher market-
to-book value of asset or equity, have more severe agency problem of underinvestment (i.e. debt 
overhang). Put differently, the fewer investment opportunities, the less severe the potential conflict 
over the exercise of those investment options. If overconfidence influences debt maturity through the 
agency channel, we expect that the overconfidence-debt maturity relation will be stronger for high 
growth firms which are associated with more underinvestment problem. Consistent with hypothesis 3, 
Table 5 shows that the coefficients on both I and NPRs of CEO are more significant for firms with 
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higher market-to-book value of asset. These results are generally robust to an alternative measure of 
investment opportunities that is market-to-book value of equity. 
        Leverage: IIDILUP¶VOHYHUDJHLVKLJKDFFRUGLQJWRWUDGH-off theory of capital structure, the firm 
will be reluctant to use more debt. In other words, only firms with relatively low leverage will use debt 
and thus have to make debt maturity decision. Consistent with hypothesis 4, the positive 
overconfidence-debt maturity relation is found to be stronger for firms with lower leverage (see Table 
5). Thus, we find that the overconfidence-debt maturity relation is intensified for firms that do not face 
long-term debt capacity constraints.  
        To summarise, our major finding is that the effect of managerial overconfidence is stronger when 
the firm has high growth opportunities. This supports our main agency cost hypothesis (that builds on 
WKHWLPLQJHIIHFWIURP+DFNEDUWK¶VPRGHO), which posits that managerial overconfidence can 
reduce underinvestment problem, in a novel scenario where the underinvestment problem is 
exacerbated, i.e. for firms with more growth opportunities. In addition, high leverage makes firms less 
likely to use debt, which in turns weakens the positive overconfident-debt maturity relation.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.4. Can Other Agency Problems Be Alternative Explanations?  
As discussed in section 2.2.3, if the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt 
maturity can be explained by the risk-shifting problem, we expect that this positive relation is stronger 
for firms with higher risk-shifting incentives as indicated by deteriorating firm performance 
(hypothesis 5). Inconsistent with this hypothesis, Table 6 shows that the positive coefficients on 
overconfidence measures are generally stronger for better-performing firms with higher abnormal 
earnings (Panel A), higher average sales growth in the past five years (Panel B), and higher price 
performance (Panel C).  
        In addition, based on section 2.2.3, the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and 
debt maturity may also be explained by the overinvestment problem if we find that managerial 
overconfidence significantly increases leverage. However, inconsistent with hypothesis 6, we do not 
find significantly positive associations between our managerial overconfidence measures and leverage. 
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In results, available upon request, only the NPR-based overconfidence measures have positive but 
insignificant effects on leverage, while all the word-based overconfidence measures have negative 
effects on leverage. This finding is not surprising because overconfident managers may use debt 
conservatively (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011). Overall, the above analysis suggests that neither 
risk-shifting nor overinvestment can explain the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.5. Robustness Tests 
We conduct a series of robustness tests in Table 7 based on alternative debt maturity measures, 
overconfidence measures, estimation methods, and controlling for ownership structure.  
        Alternative debt maturity measures: First, we attempt to construct an alternative debt maturity 
measure using more detailed long-term debt data, including debt that matures in greater than five years 
and less than 10 years (WC18284) and debt that matures in greater than ten years (WC18285). These 
two data items have been unfortunately discontinued by the Worldscope and are only available up to 
2004. We create an alternative debt maturity measure, also used in the early UK studies (e.g., Ozkan, 
2000), namely LTD5/TD. LTD5/TD is the ratio of debt that matures in over five years to total debt. In 
Panel A (models 1-4) of Table 7, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on LTD5/TD 
over the subperiod 2000-2004. The coefficients on first person singular pronouns (I) and CEO_VA and 
CEO_VOL are positive and statistically significant. In addition, in models 5-8, we use the ratio of 
long-term liabilities to total liabilities (LTL/TL) as an alternative measure of debt maturity and find 
consistent results. Thus, the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is 
robust to the alternative measures of debt maturity.  
        Alternative overconfidence measures: In untabulated tests (available upon request), we regress 
debt maturity on binary variables based on first person singular pronoun (I) and net purchase ratios 
(NPRs) of CEO. I_DUMMY is coded as 1 if I is in the top decile and 0 otherwise. CEO_NPD is net 
purchase dummy which takes the value of 1 if the NPRs of CEO are above zero and 0 otherwise. 
Consistent with our main findings, I_DUMMY has a positive and significant effect (p-value=0.053) on 
debt maturity in fixed effects regressions. In addition, the coefficients on CEO_NPD are positive and 
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statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, the positive relation between overconfidence and debt 
maturity is robust to alternative measures of I and NPRs of CEO.  
        Alternative estimation methods: First, to address a potential endogeneity concern that debt 
maturity and leverage may be jointly endogenous variables, following Datta et al. (2005) we conduct 
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis where these two variables are simultaneously 
determined. Specifically, we control for the predicted leverage, estimated from the first-stage 
regression, in the second-stage regression where the dependent variable is debt maturity. Consistent 
with the results from the fixed effects regressions, the positive coefficients on our main 
overconfidence measures are still significant in the second stage of 2SLS in models 1-4 of Panel B. 
Second, we use RE-Tobit estimator because the debt maturity ratio is bounded between zero and one.37 
We also find consistent results from the RE-Tobit regressions in models 5-6 of Panel B.38  
        Controlling for ownership structure: A potential limitation of our empirical analysis so far is that 
we do not incorporate any direct measure of corporate governance, although any time-invariant 
governance characteristics are controlled using the fixed effects estimator. We use two measures of 
ownership structure as additional control variables. 39  We first control for insider ownership 
concentration, constructed as the number of closely-held shares (CHS) as a percentage of total 
common shares outstanding. Worldscope defines the CHS as shares held by insiders (e.g. directors, 
firms and individual investors) (see Appendix A for the detailed definition). The CHS is an important 
component of the FTSE Institutional Investor Services (ISS) Corporate Governance Index. Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) document that insider ownership has a significantly negative effect on the 
quality of governance practices. Controlling for insider ownership, models 1-4 of Panel C show that 
the coefficients on various managerial overconfidence measures are still positive and significant.  
                                            
37
 The RE-Tobit is estimated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature and our results are robust to quadrature sensitivity. We use the 
³TXDGFKN´FRPPDnd to check whether the coefficients change substantially using different numbers of integration points.  
38 In untabulated tests, we use two-step system-GMM to address potential endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we examine a 
dynamic model where we control for the lagged debt maturity. The coefficients on the lagged debt maturity are around 0.35 
and statistically significant, suggesting that the adjustment speed of debt maturity is reasonably high. Consistent with our 
previous results, the coefficients on two overconfidence measures, I and VA_CEO are positive and statistically significant at 
10% level. However, the Sargan tests reject the validity of our internal instruments. Furthermore, as pointed out by Roodman 
(2009), the GMM results should be aggressively tested for sensitivity to different numbers of instruments. Unfortunately, our 
GMM results also seem to be sensitive to different lag structures. 
39
 A detailed examination of the effects of a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables is beyond the scope of this 
study. Future study may attempt to examine the implications of other corporate governance variables, including various board 
characteristics.  
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        Second, we control for managerial ownership, defined as the percentage of shares held by 
executive directors, which is constructed based on the ownership data from the Hemmington Scott 
insider trading database. We do not include both insider ownership and managerial ownership in the 
same regression simply because insider ownership also captures the shares held by firm directors. 
Datta et al. (2005) argue that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers and 
shareholders and thus is relevant to debt maturity decision. Models 5-6 of Panel C show that the 
positive effect of managerial overconfidence, as measured by I, on debt maturity is robust to the 
inclusion of managerial ownership. In addition, controlling for CEO ownership in untabulated tests, 
the positive coefficient on I is also statistically significant at 5% level (p-value=0.044).  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate debt maturity. We argue 
that managerial overconfidence can mitigate the agency cost of long-term debt, especially the Myers 
(1977) underinvestment problem, E\DOLJQLQJPDQDJHUV¶DQGGHEW-KROGHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVRYHUWKHILUP¶V
IXWXUH LQYHVWPHQWV 7KLV LV EDVHG RQ +DFNEDUWK¶V  model that overconfident managers invest 
more and earlier than rational managers; therefore they are less likely to underinvest. Based on this 
argument, we hypothesise that overconfidence increase debt maturity. Our study is thus different from 
Huang et al. (2016) which suggest that the managerial overconfidence decreases debt maturity from 
the information asymmetry perspective. We also contribute to the literature by developing and using 
time-varying overconfidence measures, which is important since attribution bias (see Miller and Ross, 
1975; Daniel et al., 1998) is a clear mechanism through which overconfidence is likely to be time-
varying and it also makes it much easier to control for firm fixed effects.  
        There are three major findings, supporting the agency cost of debt hypothesis of a positive 
overconfidence-debt maturity relation (hypothesis 1). First, we confirm that there is in general a 
positive relation between overconfidence and debt maturity using a wide range of time-varying 
overconfidence measures and especially for changes in overconfidence. For example, first person 
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singular pronouns (I) has a significant and positive impact on debt maturity. In addition, first person 
plural pronouns (WE) has a significantly positive effect on debt maturity for firms with below-median 
leverage. Our findings related to the first person pronouns are consistent with previous US evidence 
(Li, 2010a). Furthermore, we find that the changes in I and several tone measures have positive and 
significant effects on the changes in debt maturity. 6HFRQGZHH[DPLQHWKHUROHRIGLIIHUHQWGLUHFWRUV¶
overconfidence. If the agency cost hypothesis holds, we anticipate the overconfidence of the director 
who has most impact on investment decisions, i.e. CEO, to be crucial. Consistent with this conjecture 
(hypothesis 2), we find that only the net purchase ratios (NPRs) of CEOs, as a proxy for CEO 
overconfidence, have significantly positive effects on debt maturity.  
        Third, we examine a scenario where the underinvestment problem is exacerbated. Consistent with 
hypothesis 3, we generally find the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation is intensified for 
firms with potentially high underinvestment problem as indicated by high investment opportunities. 
This evidence further supports our agency cost hypothesis that underinvestment problem is the 
underlying channel through which managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity. In addition, we 
examine the moderating role of financial leverage, consistent with hypothesis 4, we find that the 
positive relation between managerial overconfidence, as measured by I, WE, and CEO NPRs 
respectively, and debt maturity are statistically and economically more significant for firm-year 
observations with below-median leverage, mainly because low-leverage firms are more able to issue 
long-term debt. Our further analysis suggests that neither agency issues of risk-shifting (hypothesis 5) 
nor overinvestment (hypothesis 6) are the main channels generating the positive relation between 
overconfidence and debt maturity. Instead, this study, overall, supports the view that managerial 
overconfidence reduces the agency cost of debt associated with the underinvestment problem. Thus, 
managerial overconfidence can have a positive effect. Future study may examine the effect of 
managerial overconfidence on the cost of debt. Moreover, our study emphasizes the importance of 
controlling for firm fixed effects when examining the effect of managerial overconfidence on 
corporate policies, in which case a time-varying overconfidence measure is particularly useful.  
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Table 1 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent variables. Panel B 
shows Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables (Note: a complete correlation matrix 
including all variables is available upon request).  
Panel A: Summary statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
I 865 0.432 0.310 0.453 0.000 3.430 
WE 865 2.743 2.730 1.738 0.000 8.400 
Net emotion 865 0.731 0.749 0.166 0.069 1.000 
Certain1 865 0.991 0.920 0.418 0.000 3.270 
Optimism 865 53.334 53.140 2.141 41.080 72.420 
Certain2  865 45.606 46.000 3.284 22.550 54.530 
Tone_H 865 0.705 0.754 0.241 -1.000 1.000 
Tone_LM 865 0.545 0.575 0.296 -1.000 1.000 
TONE 865 -0.000 0.192 1.611 -6.560 5.947 
VA_CH 448 0.592 1.000 0.778 -1.000 1.000 
VA_CEO 445 0.456 1.000 0.836 -1.000 1.000 
VA_CFO 407 0.547 1.000 0.795 -1.000 1.000 
VOL_CH 448 0.642 1.000 0.709 -1.000 1.000 
VOL_CEO 445 0.498 1.000 0.791 -1.000 1.000 
VOL_CFO 407 0.603 1.000 0.733 -1.000 1.000 
LTD/TD 865 0.664 0.758 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Tax 865 0.211 0.266 0.391 -1.717 2.046 
Abnormal earnings 865 0.048 0.011 0.323 -0.858 1.917 
Firm size 865 12.148 12.125 1.821 8.446 17.132 
Liquidity  865 1.484 1.285 0.931 0.376 6.063 
M/B asset 865 1.525 1.323 0.738 0.553 4.691 
Asset maturity 865 9.388 6.659 11.041 1.318 95.028 
Earnings volatility 865 0.114 0.060 0.212 0.003 3.183 
Leverage 865 0.208 0.196 0.144 0.002 0.620 
Price performance 865 -0.034 0.059 0.563 -1.911 1.213 
 
Panel B: Pairwise correlation matrix (selected variables) 
 Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. I 1         
2. WE 0.104 1        
3. Net emotion 0.128 0.101 1       
4. Certain1 0.177 0.088 0.145 1      
5. Optimism 0.183 0.112 0.445 0.246 1     
6. Certain2  0.044 0.019 -0.044 0.127 0.063 1    
7. Tone_H -0.021 0.057 0.458 0.047 0.372 -0.025 1   
8. Tone_LM 0.071 0.072 0.612 0.097 0.520 -0.022 0.670 1  
9. TONE 0.126 0.112 0.788 0.261 0.728 0.004 0.774 0.881 1 
10. VA_CH 0.053 -0.053 -0.110 0.050 -0.093 -0.014 -0.064 -0.077 -0.100 
11. VA_CEO 0.032 -0.052 -0.068 -0.071 -0.116 0.005 -0.133 -0.139 -0.147 
12. VA_CFO 0.051 -0.056 -0.081 -0.001 -0.020 -0.083 -0.083 -0.127 -0.098 
13. VOL_CH 0.089 -0.042 -0.097 0.063 -0.065 0.004 -0.065 -0.071 -0.085 
14. VOL_CEO 0.029 -0.041 -0.041 -0.071 -0.119 -0.030 -0.124 -0.129 -0.134 
15. VOL_CFO 0.054 -0.075 -0.069 0.008 -0.027 -0.089 -0.096 -0.126 -0.099 
16. LTD/TD -0.000 0.044 0.092 0.086 0.116 0.002 0.046 0.076 0.109 
 Variable  10 11 12 13 14 15 16   
10. VA_CH 1         
11. VA_CEO 0.477 1        
12. VA_CFO 0.401 0.763 1       
13. VOL_CH 0.951 0.505 0.405 1      
14. VOL_CEO 0.498 0.958 0.758 0.527 1     
15. VOL_CFO 0.432 0.756 0.959 0.446 0.788 1    
16. LTD/TD -0.035 -0.032 -0.043 -0.009 -0.009 -0.033 1   
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Table 2 Words-based measures of overconfidence and debt maturity 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measure on first person pronouns (Panel A) and 
YDULRXV WRQH PHDVXUHV RI &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW 3DQHO % DQG FRQWURO YDULDEOHV DV GHILQHG LQ
Appendix A. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the 
models are estimated using fixed effects (FE). p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: The effects of first person pronouns on debt maturity 
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE 
I 0.046**      
 [0.027]      
WE  0.003     
  [0.686]     
Ln(I+1)   0.071*    
   [0.066]    
Ln(WE+1)    0.021   
    [0.386]   
I_NON-ZERO     0.051***  
     [0.004]  
WE_NON-ZERO      -0.002 
      [0.786] 
Tax -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 
 [0.631] [0.598] [0.624] [0.596] [0.563] [0.530] 
Abnormal earning -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 0.012 0.001 
 [0.745] [0.846] [0.771] [0.853] [0.732] [0.971] 
Firm size 0.058** 0.058** 0.059** 0.058** 0.057 0.058* 
 [0.040] [0.037] [0.038] [0.039] [0.106] [0.064] 
Liquidity 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.154*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
M/B asset 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.023 0.011 
 [0.748] [0.782] [0.762] [0.762] [0.401] [0.625] 
Asset maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.823] [0.827] [0.806] [0.801] [0.797] [0.823] 
Earnings volatility 0.094 0.092 0.094 0.092 0.074 0.087 
 [0.170] [0.176] [0.169] [0.178] [0.252] [0.222] 
Leverage 0.353** 0.352** 0.349** 0.355** 0.394** 0.404** 
 [0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.017] [0.013] 
Price performance 0.030* 0.031* 0.031* 0.031* 0.009 0.027 
 [0.068] [0.058] [0.066] [0.059] [0.612] [0.114] 
Constant -0.358 -0.348 -0.369 -0.362 -0.380 -0.350 
 [0.307] [0.312] [0.296] [0.302] [0.384] [0.359] 
Obs. 865 865 865 865 685 795 
Firms 192 192 192 192 180 184 ܴଶ  0.143 0.137 0.142 0.138 0.139 0.151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
Table 2 - continued 
Panel B: The effects of optimistic tone on debt maturity 
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE 
Optimism 0.003    
 [0.393]    
Tone_LM  0.021   
  [0.548]   
TONE   0.002  
   [0.708]  
TONE_RES    0.002 
    [0.714] 
Tax -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 [0.605] [0.588] [0.599] [0.597] 
Abnormal earning 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 [0.688] [0.670] [0.681] [0.683] 
Firm size 0.059** 0.059** 0.059** 0.059** 
 [0.031] [0.030] [0.033] [0.032] 
Liquidity 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
M/B asset 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013 
 [0.552] [0.576] [0.566] [0.522] 
Asset maturity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.723] [0.696] [0.716] [0.716] 
Earnings volatility 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.072 
 [0.229] [0.218] [0.223] [0.223] 
Leverage 0.358** 0.352** 0.352** 0.349** 
 [0.028] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] 
Price performance 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.022 
 [0.211] [0.236] [0.223] [0.181] 
Constant -0.560 -0.357 -0.342 -0.344 
 [0.197] [0.291] [0.320] [0.315] 
Obs. 865 865 865 865 
Firms 192 192 192 192 ܴଶ  0.157 0.156 0.156 0.156 
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Table 3 Changes of words-based measures of overconfidence and change of debt 
maturity 
This table presents regressions of change of debt maturity measure on the changes of first person 
SURQRXQV DQG YDULRXV WRQH PHDVXUHV RI &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW DQG FRQWURO YDULDEOHV DV GHILQHG LQ
Appendix A. The dependent variable is the change of ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e.  ? 
LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using first difference (FD) estimator (i.e. first-differenced data 
with OLS regression). p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) FD (2) FD (3) FD (4) FD (5) FD (6) FD  ? I 0.049**      
 [0.011]       ? WE  0.001     
  [0.841]      ? Optimism   0.004    
   [0.288]     ? Tone_LM    0.059*   
    [0.078]    ? TONE     0.010  
     [0.108]   ? TONE_RES      0.009* 
      [0.100]  ? Tax 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 [0.424] [0.489] [0.484] [0.491] [0.521] [0.533]  ? Abnormal earnings -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.756] [0.837] [0.871] [0.941] [0.923] [0.920]  ? Firm size -0.014 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 
 [0.835] [0.864] [0.907] [0.847] [0.857] [0.864]  ? Liquidity 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.158*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  ? M/B asset 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.023 
 [0.339] [0.351] [0.387] [0.450] [0.460] [0.372]  ? Asset maturity 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.787] [0.854] [0.868] [0.916] [0.888] [0.886]  ? Earnings volatility 0.075* 0.073* 0.071* 0.066* 0.066 0.065 
 [0.077] [0.087] [0.089] [0.096] [0.102] [0.104]  ? Leverage 0.160 0.162 0.171 0.172 0.184 0.172 
 [0.294] [0.291] [0.269] [0.262] [0.242] [0.266]  ? Price performance -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012 -0.004 
 [0.569] [0.618] [0.600] [0.461] [0.504] [0.781] 
Constant 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.516] [0.556] [0.560] [0.478] [0.482] [0.481] 
Obs.  663 663 663 663 663 663 
Firms 192 192 192 192 192 192 ܴଶ 0.150 0.142 0.144 0.148 0.146 0.147 
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Table 4 Action-based measures of overconfidence and debt maturity 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on the NPRs of Chairman, CEO and CFO 
and control variables, as defined in Appendix A. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt 
to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using fixed effects (FE). p-values are given 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE 
VA_CH -0.016      
 [0.274]      
VA_CEO  0.032*     
  [0.062]     
VA_CFO   -0.015    
   [0.456]    
VOL_CH    -0.012   
    [0.505]   
VOL_CEO     0.037*  
     [0.076]  
VOL_CFO      -0.014 
      [0.533] 
Tax -0.035 -0.014 -0.009 -0.035 -0.013 -0.009 
 [0.199] [0.556] [0.666] [0.202] [0.563] [0.657] 
Abnormal earning -0.030 -0.067 -0.067 -0.030 -0.068 -0.067 
 [0.384] [0.127] [0.140] [0.386] [0.123] [0.140] 
Firm size 0.132*** 0.065* 0.035 0.131*** 0.063* 0.037 
 [0.001] [0.080] [0.435] [0.001] [0.088] [0.412] 
Liquidity 0.157*** 0.192*** 0.185*** 0.156*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] 
M/B asset 0.029 -0.021 0.010 0.031 -0.020 0.011 
 [0.332] [0.593] [0.756] [0.303] [0.606] [0.737] 
Asset maturity 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.000 
 [0.445] [0.414] [0.900] [0.448] [0.393] [0.901] 
Earnings volatility 0.040 0.050 0.219 0.040 0.050 0.221 
 [0.355] [0.332] [0.299] [0.365] [0.321] [0.301] 
Leverage 0.118 0.595*** 0.527** 0.119 0.592*** 0.524** 
 [0.490] [0.007] [0.017] [0.491] [0.008] [0.017] 
Price performance 0.018 0.052** 0.037 0.017 0.052** 0.037 
 [0.501] [0.040] [0.141] [0.504] [0.044] [0.142] 
Constant -1.257*** -0.540 -0.151 -1.245*** -0.517 -0.176 
 [0.007] [0.255] [0.792] [0.007] [0.274] [0.760] 
Obs. 448 445 407 448 445 407 
Firms 162 156 141 162 156 141 ܴଶ  0.179 0.233 0.144 0.178 0.234 0.143 
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Table 5 The moderating effects of investment opportunities and leverage 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on first person pronouns and NPRs of CEO 
and control variables, as defined in Appendix A. Subsamples split based on the medians of market-to-
book value of asset (Panel A), market-to-book value of equity (Panel B) and leverage (Panel C) are 
estimated to examine the impacts of the above firm characteristics on the overconfidence-debt 
maturity relation. All firm level control variables are included in all models but not reported to save 
space. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models 
are estimated using fixed effects (FE) or first difference (FD) estimator. p-values are given in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FD (4) FD (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
Panel A: M/B asset High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.055* 0.014       
 [0.095] [0.634]        ? I   0.049** 0.069*     
   [0.030] [0.052]     
CEO_VA     0.049** 0.018   
     [0.046] [0.412]   
CEO_VOL       0.056* 0.018 
       [0.069] [0.445] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.162 0.163 0.166 0.125 0.250 0.269 0.252 0.268 
Obs. 433 432 321 342 209 236 209 236 
Panel B: M/B equity High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.065* 0.057       
 [0.058] [0.111]        ? I   0.060** 0.054*     
   [0.014] [0.093]     
CEO_VA     0.048* 0.042**   
     [0.067] [0.046]   
CEO_VOL       0.054* 0.042* 
       [0.088] [0.088] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.179 0.146 0.159 0.133 0.321 0.238 0.322 0.237 
Obs. 432 433 324 339 219 226 219 226 
Panel C: Leverage  High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.043 0.060**       
 [0.186] [0.049]        ? I   0.045* 0.067**     
   [0.061] [0.032]     
CEO_VA     0.008 0.066*   
     [0.619] [0.070]   
CEO_VOL       0.011 0.067* 
       [0.614] [0.095] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.389 0.088 0.322 0.073 0.404 0.205 0.405 0.203 
Obs. 433 432 333 330 222 223 222 223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
Table 6 Can the overconfidence-debt maturity relation be explained by the risk-shifting 
problem 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on first person pronouns and NPRs of CEO 
and control variables, as defined in Appendix A. Subsamples split based on the medians of abnormal 
earnings (a proxy for firm quality) in Panel A, average sales growth in the past five years in Panel B 
and price performance in Panel C are estimated to examine the impacts of the above firm 
characteristics on the overconfidence-debt maturity relation. All firm level control variables are 
included in all models but not reported to save space. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term 
debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using fixed effects (FE) or first 
difference (FD) estimator. p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FD (4) FD (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
Panel A: Abnormal 
earnings 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.075* -0.003       
 [0.059] [0.927]        ? I   0.062** 0.052**     
   [0.039] [0.048]     
CEO_VA     0.062** 0.011   
     [0.044] [0.766]   
CEO_VOL       0.077** 0.014 
       [0.030] [0.745] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.180 0.120 0.158 0.104 0.430 0.250 0.430 0.250 
Obs. 432 433 330 333 229 216 229 216 
Panel B: Average 
sales growth 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.072** 0.015       
 [0.040] [0.579]        ? I   0.085*** 0.029     
   [0.002] [0.277]     
CEO_VA     0.031 0.031   
     [0.145] [0.219]   
CEO_VOL       0.040 0.030 
       [0.129] [0.289] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.140 0.190 0.138 0.162 0.350 0.200 0.350 0.290 
Obs. 458 407 344 319 204 241 204 241 
Panel C: Price 
performance 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.063* 0.013       
 [0.092] [0.587]        ? I   0.081*** 0.032     
   [0.001] [0.278]     
CEO_VA     0.021 0.025   
     [0.263] [0.415]   
CEO_VOL       0.019 0.026 
       [0.389] [0.410] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.140 0.140 0.110 0.170 0.210 0.320 0.210 0.320 
Obs. 432 433 335 328 216 229 216 229 
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Table 7 Robustness tests 
This table presents various robustness tests. Panel A reports the effects of first person pronouns and 
NPRs of CEO respectively on two alternative measures of debt maturity. The dependent variable in 
models 1-4 is LTD5/TD defined as the ratio of debt that matures in more than five years to total debt. 
The dependent variable in models 5-8 is LTL/TL defined as the ratio of long-term liabilities to total 
liabilities. Models 1-4 are based on the subperiod 2000-2004 due to limited availability of LTD5/TD. 
Panel B reports the results from two alternative estimation methods. Specifically, models 1-4 use 
2SLS where debt maturity and leverage are simultaneously determined and models 5-8 use RE-Tobit. 
Panel C controls for insider ownership in models 1-4 and managerial ownership in models 5-8. All 
other firm level control variables are included in all models but not reported to save space. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD) in both Panel B and C. All 
the models in Panel A and C are estimated using fixed effects (FE) or first difference (FD) estimator. 
p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Alternative debt maturity measures 
 Dependent variable=LTD5/TD Dependent variable=LTL/TL 
 (1) FE (2) FD (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FD (7) FE (8) FE 
I 0.066*    0.026**    
 [0.092]    [0.023]     ? I  0.029    0.031***   
  [0.102]    [0.001]   
CEO_VA   0.078***    0.034*  
   [0.006]    [0.055]  
CEO_VOL    0.089***    0.037* 
    [0.006]    [0.066] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.090 0.121 0.500 0.510 0.260 0.187 0.280 0.280 
Obs. 231 144 99 99 865 663 445 445 
Panel B: Alternative estimation methods 
 (1)-(4) 2SLS (second-stage regressions) (5)-(8) RE-Tobit 
I 0.046**    0.034*    
 [0.029]    [0.090]     ? I  0.057***    0.085***   
  [0.009]    [0.004]   
CEO_VA   0.033*    0.031*  
   [0.075]    [0.052]  
CEO_VOL    0.038*    0.034** 
    [0.062]    [0.047] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.142 0.085 0.232 0.233     
Log likelihood     -36.42 -256.40 -33.74 -33.64 
Obs. 865 663 407 407 865 663 445 445 
Panel C: Controlling for ownership structure  
 (1) FE (2) FD (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FD (7) FE (8) FE 
I 0.047**    0.061*    
 [0.025]    [0.080]     ? I  0.060***    0.076***   
  [0.002]    [0.007]   
CEO_VA   0.032*    0.027  
   [0.066]    [0.236]  
CEO_VOL    0.036*    0.027 
    [0.080]    [0.301] 
Insider ownership -0.000 -0.002* 0.000 0.000     
 [0.792] [0.090] [0.692] [0.709]     
Managerial ownership     0.000 -0.001 0.007*** 0.007*** 
     [0.824] [0.624] [0.002] [0.002] 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ܴଶ  0.140 0.127 0.230 0.230 0.180 0.119 0.290 0.290 
Obs. 863 661 445 445 436 287 223 223 
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Appendix A Variable definitions 
Variables Definition 
Panel A: words-based measure of overconfidence: first person pronouns 
I The percentage of first person singular pronouns LQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW 
WE 7KHSHUFHQWDJHRIILUVWSHUVRQSOXUDOSURQRXQVLQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW 
Panel B: words-based measure of overconfidence: optimistic tone 
Net emotion Positive emotion minus negative emotion including (anxiety, anger and sadness) as 
defined by LIWC 
Certain1 Measure of certainty (e.g. always, never) as one aspect of cognitive processes as 
defined by LIWC 
Optimism [praise+satisfaction+inspiration]-[blame+hardship+denial] as defined by Diction 
Certain2  [tenacity+leveling+collectives+insistence]-[numerical terms+ambivalence+self 
reference+variety] as defined by Diction  
Tone_H The ratio of (positive words-negative words) to (positive words+negative words), 
based on +HQU\¶VZRUGOLVWs. Examples of positive (negative) words are 
positive, success, improve, etc. (negative, fail, worsen, etc.).  
Tone_LM The ratio of (positive words-negative words) to (positive words+negative words), 
based on /RXJKUDQDQG0F'RQDOG¶VZRUGOLVWs. Examples of positive 
(negative) words are enhance, excellent, profitable, etc. (weak, poor, loss, etc.). 
TONE Composite tone index (see Section 3.2.2 for more descriptions) 
TONE_RES Orthogonalized tone index (see Section 3.2.2 for more descriptions) 
Panel C: action-based measure of overconfidence: net purchase ratio (NPR), defined as the difference between 
insider purchases and sales divided by the sum of insider purchases DQGVDOHVRIRZQILUP¶VVKDUHV 
VA_CH The value-based net purchase ratio of Chairman 
VA_CEO The value-based net purchase ratio of CEO 
VA_CFO The value-based net purchase ratio of CFO 
VOL_CH The volume-based net purchase ratio of Chairman 
VOL_CEO The volume-based net purchase ratio of CEO 
VOL_CFO The volume-based net purchase ratio of CFO 
Panel D: firm characteristics  
LTD/TD The ratio of long-term debt that matures in more than one year to total debt 
LTD5/TD The ratio of long-term debt that matures in more than five years to total debt 
LTL/TL The ratio of long-term liabilities to total liabilities 
Tax The ratio of income taxes to pre-tax income 
Abnormal earnings 7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQQH[W\HDU¶VDQGWKLV\HDU¶VHDUQLQJVSHUVKDUHVFDOHGby this 
\HDU¶VVWRFNSULFH 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Liquidity  The ratio of current assets to current liability 
M/B asset The ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value 
of equity to book value of total assets 
M/B equity The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity 
Asset maturity The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to depreciation expense 
Earnings volatility The standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in the past five years (at least 
three years), scaled by the average book value of assets 
Leverage The ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets 
Price performance The difference of natural logarithm of fiscal year-end share prices 
Average sales growth The average sales growth rate in the past five years 
Insider ownership The number of closely-held shares (CHS) as a percentage of total common shares 
outstanding. Worldscope defines the CHS as shares held by insiders including senior 
corporate officers, directors and their immediate families; trusts; any other 
corporation; pension/benefit plans; individuals who hold 5% or more of shares 
outstanding. 
Managerial ownership The percentage of shares held by executive directors 
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